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 1 
INTEREST AND IDENTITY OF AMICI CURIAE 
AND CONSENT OF THE PARTIES1 
Undersigned amici, non-profit groups who work to improve the 
criminal justice system, have an interest in ensuring a criminal 
defendant’s right to counsel in capital federal habeas proceedings. 
Federal habeas petitioners are entitled not just to a body at counselor’s 
table, but competent and meaningful representation. Nowhere is this 
right more critical than in the context of capital cases, where life or 
death is at stake. Amici believe the District Court’s order here 
forecloses such representation and sets dangerous precedent. Should it 
stand, capital post-conviction counsel are precluded from supplying the 
vigorous advocacy their clients need by the very judiciary who acts as 
the last mainstay for constitutional review before possible execution. 
The Roderick and Solange MacArthur Justice Center at St. 
Louis. The Roderick and Solange MacArthur Justice Center at St. 
                                      
 
1 Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 29(c)(5), amici state that: party’s counsel 
did not author this brief, in whole or in part; neither a party nor a 
party’s counsel – nor any other person, other than the amici, their 
members or their counsel – contributed money that was intended to 
fund preparing or submitting this brief. 
 2 
Louis (MJC-STL) is a non-profit, public interest law firm that advocates 
positive reform of the criminal justice system. MJC-STL is the newest 
office of the Roderick and Solange MacArthur Justice Center, which 
also has offices in Chicago (at the Northwestern Pritzker School of 
Law), New Orleans, and at the University of Mississippi Law School. 
The Roderick and Solange MacArthur Justice Center was founded in 
1985 by the family of J. Roderick MacArthur to advocate for human 
rights and social justice through litigation. It has led battles against 
myriad civil rights injustices, including police misconduct, fighting for 
the rights of the indigent in the criminal justice system, and pursuing 
compensation for the wrongfully convicted. 
National Association for Public Defense. The National 
Association for Public Defense (NAPD) is an association of more than 
14,000 professionals who deliver the right to counsel throughout all 
U.S. states and territories. NAPD members include attorneys, 
investigators, social workers, administrators and other support staff 
who are responsible for executing the constitutional right to effective 
assistance of counsel, including regularly researching and providing 
advice to clients in death penalty cases. We are the advocates in jails, in 
 3 
courtrooms, and in communities and are experts in not only theoretical 
best practices, but also in the practical, day-to-day delivery of services. 
Our collective expertise represents state, county, and local systems 
through full-time, contract, and assigned counsel delivery mechanisms, 
dedicated juvenile, capital and appellate offices, and through a diversity 
of traditional and holistic practice models. NAPD provides webinar-
based and other training to its members, including training on the 
utmost importance of protecting the right to counsel in all phases of 
capital litigation. Accordingly, NAPD has a strong interest in the issue 
raised in this appeal. 
National Legal Aid & Defender Association. The National 
Legal Aid & Defender Association (NLADA), founded in 1911, is 
America’s oldest and largest nonprofit association devoted to excellence 
in the delivery of legal services to those who cannot afford counsel. For 
100 years, NLADA has pioneered access to justice and right to counsel 
at the national, state, and local level. NLADA serves as a collective 
voice for our country’s public defense providers and civil legal aid 
attorneys and provides advocacy, training, and technical assistance to 
further its goal of securing equal justice. The Association pays 
 4 
particular attention to procedures and policies that affect the 
constitutional rights of the accused, both adults and youth. 
National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers. The 
National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers (NACDL) is a 
nonprofit voluntary professional bar association that works on behalf of 
criminal defense attorneys to ensure justice and due process for those 
accused of crime or misconduct. NACDL was founded in 1958. It has a 
nationwide membership of many thousands of direct members, and up 
to 40,000 with affiliates. NACDL’s members include private criminal 
defense lawyers, public defenders, military defense counsel, law 
professors, and judges. NACDL is the only nationwide professional bar 
association for public defenders and private criminal defense lawyers. 
NACDL is dedicated to advancing the proper, efficient, and just 
administration of justice. NACDL files numerous amicus briefs each 
year in the U.S. Supreme Court and other federal and state courts, 
seeking to provide amicus assistance in cases that present issues of 
broad importance to criminal defendants, criminal defense lawyers, and 
the criminal justice system as a whole. NACDL has a particular interest 
in this case, Christeson v. Roper.  
 5 
Amici file this brief pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 29(a). Both parties 
consent to the filing of this amici curiae brief on behalf of the 
organizations listed above. 
INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This case involves a district court’s patent disregard for a deeply 
mentally impaired defendant’s right to meaningful representation in 
capital federal habeas proceedings. By funding only 6% of defense 
counsel’s request for necessary expert and other resources, the District 
Court violated the constitution, ignored federal statutory mandates, 
flouted the Supreme Court’s remand order, blocked counsel’s ability to 
satisfy professional and ethical obligations, publicly disclosed contents 
of previously protected information about defense strategy, and set a 
very dangerous precedent for our justice system. 
The District Court’s Order of April 29, 2015 (“the Budget Order”) 
blocked Mr. Christeson’s attorneys from developing and presenting 
evidence from mental health experts necessary to fully litigate his 
defense to a time bar caused by prior counsel’s shameful abandonment 
of their cognitively disabled client. The Budget Order effectively denied 
Mr. Christeson’s right to counsel under 18 U.S.C.§ 3599 as well as his 
 6 
rights to Due Process and Equal Protection in the administration of 
that statute. If the District Court’s Budget Order stands, Mr. 
Christeson will be denied his right to federal habeas relief and to the 
investigation and litigation that the Supreme Court specifically ordered 
on remand because prior counsel abdicated their duties to provide it.  
Mr. Christeson’s former court-appointed counsel did not even meet 
with him until more than six weeks after his federal habeas petition 
was due. Christeson v. Roper, 135 S.Ct. 891, 892 (2015). When they 
finally did file a habeas petition—117 days too late, absent equitable 
tolling—the District Court dismissed the petition as untimely. Id. 
Current counsel is, therefore, forced to contend with overcoming this 
time bar on behalf of their cognitively disabled client. 
To meet this most formidable lawyering task, Mr. Christeson’s 
current attorneys requested fair and adequate support for investigative, 
expert, and other representation expenses. The District Court Order 
denying Mr. Christeson a hearing on his equitable tolling defense 
demonstrates the prejudice from the denial of funds necessary to 
develop available expert evidence supporting that defense. Those 
resources are necessary for current counsel to demonstrate that Mr. 
 7 
Christeson is entitled to constitutional review of his Missouri state 
court conviction and sentence. 
As a matter of law and public policy the District Court’s actions 
cannot be countenanced. Therefore, this Court should set aside such 
dangerous precedent, which threatens Mr. Christeson’s life and the 
integrity of our justice system, and grant the relief requested by counsel 
for Petitioner. 
ARGUMENT 
I. The District Court’s Order Denying Necessary Funds 
Constitutes Effective Denial of Mr. Christeson’s 18 U.S.C. § 
3599 Right to Capital Habeas Counsel 
A. The Federal Statutory Right to Counsel Under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3599 Requires Much More Than a Warm Body Alone 
Of the various mechanisms intended to ensure reliability and 
fairness in imposition of the death penalty, federal habeas proceedings 
remain the last mainstay. See U.S. CONST., Art. I, § 9, cl. 2; see also, e.g., 
Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 747 (1991) (the writ of habeas 
corpus serves as “a bulwark against convictions that violate 
fundamental fairness”) (internal quotation and citation omitted). Thus 
18 U.S.C. § 3599 provides for the unquestionable right to appointed 
counsel in capital cases in federal court – even during post-conviction 
 8 
habeas corpus proceedings. See, e.g., Martel v. Clair, 132 S.Ct. 1276, 
1280 (2012); McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 849, 859 (1994). 
In creating a mandatory statutory right to appointed counsel in 
capital habeas proceedings in Section 3599, Congress underscored the 
important role such proceedings play in “promoting fundamental 
fairness in the imposition of the death penalty.” McFarland, 512 U.S. at 
859; see also Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 483, (2000). This “right to 
counsel necessarily includes a right for that counsel meaningfully to 
research and present a defendant’s habeas claims.” McFarland, 512 
U.S. at 858; see also Martel, 132 S.Ct. at 1285. 
Beyond this, Section 3599 expressly provides protections to ensure 
representation by highly qualified and effective defense teams in capital 
post-conviction proceedings. For instance, attorney members of the post-
conviction team must have significant past experience in both serious 
felonies and appellate practice. See 18 U.S.C. § 3599(c). Such experience 
should not be compensated at the rate of an intern, much less an entry-
level attorney with no habeas experience. 
Section 3599 additionally embodies the idea that post-conviction 
representation requires significant fact and mitigation investigation 
 9 
beyond that conducted by prior counsel at the trial or direct appeal 
stages. See 18 U.S.C. § 3599 (g)(2). Retaining services of experts, such 
as forensic psychologists, medical professionals, and trauma specialists, 
is also fully contemplated by the express terms of Section 3599. Id. 
Thus the clear language of Section 3599 seeks to ensure more 
than a warm body at counsel table during capital post-conviction 
proceedings in federal court. The statutory right to, and role of, counsel 
constructed under Section 3599 is one that is robust, contemplating the 
kind of specialized efforts required in a complex, fact-intensive, science-
heavy matter such as Mr. Christeson’s.  
Here counsel seeks to overcome a habeas petition time bar by way 
of equitable tolling based on prior counsel’s abandonment of a seriously 
impaired client. The question of Mr. Christeson’s mental capacity 
presents a complicated factual and forensic inquiry, not just a simple 
legal argument to be won solely by clever lawyers.  
In order to demonstrate Mr. Christeson’s incompetence to proceed 
on his own during his earlier habeas proceedings, see Holland v. 
Florida, 560 U.S. 631 (2010), his attorneys must retain experts and 
specialists in the field of neuroscience, psychology and intellectual 
 10 
disabilities. Yet under the Order, the defense team would have to forego 
the aid of: (a) a mitigation investigator for investigating and generating 
a psycho-social history of the Petitioner, including an analysis of Mr. 
Christeson’s cognitive impairments; (b) a neuropsychologist for 
determining Mr. Christeson’s neuropsychological functioning; (c) a 
neuroimaging analyst to aid in determining Mr. Christeson’s 
competence for appreciating his legal rights during the time he was 
represented by former counsel; (d) an intellectual disabilities specialist 
for evaluating Mr. Christeson’s potential intellectual limitations and 
disabilities which also would bear upon the question of his competence; 
and (e) clinical psychologists for evaluating the impact of Mr. 
Christeson’s childhood trauma on his ability to assist his counsel and 
advance his own legal interests. Section 3599 cannot be interpreted in 
such a stinting fashion. 
It is clear Petitioner’s counsel are not aiming to profit off their 
advocacy in this case. Even if counsel worked completely for free, the 
$10,000 permitted here would not come close to adequately 
compensating other necessary members of the defense team. Thus, in 
denying requested funds, the District Court’s Budget Order works to 
 11 
constructively deny Mr. Christeson’s right to defense representation 
under Section 3599.  
In order for Section 3599’s provisions to have any meaning, they 
may not be interpreted as requiring counsel to proceed without further 
in-depth investigation and absent the aid of necessary specialists. Yet 
the District Court’s current Budget Order ensures just that. 
B. In the Course of Administering 18 U.S.C. § 3599, District 
Courts Should Not Undermine the Efforts and Special 
Role of Defense Counsel 
Following the instructions of Section 3599, Mr. Christeson’s 
attorneys obtained leave from the District Court to file their proposed 
budget documentation ex parte and under seal. Nevertheless, the 
District Court’s Budget Order inexplicably revealed confidential and 
privileged information relating to counsel’s legal strategy, and 
advertised to future litigants and capital post-conviction counsel its 
strong-arm approach to budgeting post-conviction cases. This entirely 
denigrates the role of defense counsel, suggesting that their work, 
strategies, and duty of confidentiality to their client are at the mercy of 
the court. 
 12 
The decision to investigate certain facts, retain particular experts, 
and pursue individual theories is part of a defense attorney’s litigation 
strategy. This information is, therefore, generally protected from 
disclosure by the work product doctrine. And such ex parte 
presentations are also fully contemplated by Section 3599. But the 
Court’s sua sponte actions here, discounting and laying bare defense 
counsel’s entire case plan in its funding denial Budget Order, 
disregards this time-honored principle and disrespects the special role 
and duties of defense counsel.  
What is more, the District Court responded to counsel’s 
voluminous and detailed request for funds out-of-hand with a one-and-
one-half page summary order that fails to offer any reasoned rationale 
for how it arrived at the cumulative $10,000 budget. Worse, in an 
apparent effort to insulate its act of caprice visited upon a mentally-
impaired indigent death row inmate, the District Court boldly cited two 
decisions to suggest its decision is unreviewable on appeal. See Budget 
Order (Doc 122) (citing In re Carlyle, 644 F.2d 694 (8th Cir. 2011) and 
Rojem v. Workman, 655 F.3d 1199 (10th Cir. 2011)).  
 13 
Notably, however, these cases involved a court’s reduction of fee 
awards subsequent to its determination of the merits of the case. See id. 
Here, the District Court refused to fund Mr. Christeson’s capital 
defense team before the work was even commenced. And in so doing, it 
clearly communicated to both Mr. Christeson and the State of Missouri 
that defense counsel would not be permitted to conduct the legal and 
investigative work necessary to obtain federal habeas review. 
Such action is especially problematic in a state like Missouri, 
where the public defender system is already ranked 49th in the country 
for funding, its director recently filed suit to obtain funds withheld by 
the executive branch, and the Governor himself has now been 
conscripted to actually represent an indigent defendant. Matt Ford, A 
Governor Ordered to Serve as a Public Defender, THE ATLANTIC, Aug. 4, 
2016, http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/08/when-the-
governor-is-your-lawyer/494453/. Section 3599 should be administered 
in such a way as to protect against further deficiencies in the defender 
system – not encourage or contribute to them. 
 14 
II.  Summary Denial of Adequate Funds for Federal Capital 
Habeas Representation Deprives Death-Sentenced 
Defendants Due Process and Equal Protection of Law 
A. Governmental Processes Must Be More Than Mere 
Rituals to Satisfy Due Process and Equal Protection 
Standards Which Require Reason, Rationality, and 
Even-Handedness 
When the federal government constructed a legal process for state 
inmates to seek federal post-conviction review, it implicitly promised to 
administer the program in a fair, even-handed, and non-arbitrary way. 
See 18 U.S.C. § 3599; 28 U.S.C. § 2254; see also Evitts v. Lucy, 469 U.S. 
387, 401 (1985) (“when a State opts to act in a field where its action has 
significant discretionary elements, it must nonetheless act in accord 
with the dictates of the Constitution – and, in particular, in accord with 
the Due Process Clause”). The District Court’s action gutting Mr. 
Christeson’s right to meaningful assistance by counsel during the 
federal habeas corpus process also violated due process and equal 
protection. See Celestine Richards McConville, The Right to Effective 
Assistance of Capital Counsel: Constitutional Implications of Statutory 
Grants of Capital Counsel, 2003 WIS. L. REV. 31 (2003). 
Petitioner’s statutory right to federal post-conviction review must 
amount to more than a “meaningless ritual.” Douglas v. California, 372 
 15 
U.S. 353, 358 (1963). This commitment to coherency applies equally to 
the distribution of representation funds for “financially unable 
defendants” seeking federal habeas review following the imposition of a 
death sentence. See Douglas, 372 U.S. 353 (although there is no 
constitutional right to appeal, indigent defendants must be provided 
with free representation in order to meaningfully access the appellate 
process).  
Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has long condemned 
conditioning justice system access upon access to funds. For these 
reasons no “integral part of the . . . system for finally adjudicating the 
guilt or innocence of a defendant” may be foreclosed because of 
indigence. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18 (1956). But that is exactly 
what happened here. 
Such an obviously arbitrary exercise of power working to gut 
Section 3599’s meaning and rationality – while precluding a full and 
final check on the appropriateness of Mr. Christeson’s death sentence – 
should not be embraced by this Court. It should set a higher standard 
and prevent the further spread of these practices across the federal 
system. 
 16 
B. Because Death is Different, Due Process Generally 
Demands the Provision of Counsel During Capital Post-
Conviction Proceedings 
Nearly seventy-five years ago the United States Supreme Court 
made clear in the infamous Scottsboro Boys Case that meaningful 
representation in death penalty cases is required as a matter of due 
process of law given their weighty and unique nature. See Powell v. 
Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932). Regardless of the applicability of the 
Sixth Amendment, where a defendant faces the possibility of execution, 
fundamental fairness requires the “guiding hand of counsel at every 
step in the proceedings against him.” Id. at 69. Thus in such a case, if a 
“state or federal court were arbitrarily to refuse to hear a party by 
counsel,” “such refusal would be a denial of a hearing, and, therefore, of 
due process in the constitutional sense.” Id.  
In this case, the District Court’s denial of proper payment to 
capital defense counsel, mitigation specialists, and necessary mental 
health experts during the course of post-conviction litigation, amounted 
to an arbitrary prohibition on meaningful representation. Such 
constructive denial of counsel in the face of possible execution denied 
Mr. Christeson fundamentally fair proceedings and due process of law.  
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This is true despite the Supreme Court’s more modern right to 
counsel cases, rooted in the Sixth Amendment, see Gideon v. 
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), and even if Mr. Christeson technically 
does not currently possess a Sixth Amendment right to counsel. For 
while the High Court ultimately incorporated Sixth Amendment 
protections into prosecutions originating in the state courts, it never 
jettisoned the notion that meaningful access to an attorney in capital 
cases is a key ingredient for fundamental fairness. The same should 
hold true even in the post-conviction context. 
This is because the Court has held Fourteenth Amendment right 
to counsel protections are not limited to cases labeled criminal in 
nature, but extend to a wide range of civil matters too. This point was 
actually made in Powell, where it warned that capricious whims to 
block counsel in civil litigation violated due process. Powell, 287 U.S. at 
69 (prohibiting the “arbitrary” refusal of representation “in any case, 
civil or criminal”). And it has been more fully developed by the Court in 
later decisions over the decades.  
For instance, the Court further expanded on its thinking in 
Gagnon v. Scarpelli, determining defendants in parole and probation 
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revocation proceedings – civil matters relating to criminal sentencing – 
require counsel under appropriate circumstances. 411 U.S. 778 (1973). 
In describing the kind of case-by-case analysis that must occur in civil 
right to counsel cases, the Court made clear that provision of counsel 
must occur when the litigant facing sanction “can fairly be represented 
only by a trained advocate.” Id. at 788.  
Since its determination in Gagnon, the Court has at times 
declined to find a right to counsel in civil matters relating to the 
criminal process. And at least one of these cases involved the death 
penalty. Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1 (1989). However, in 
Giarratano, a mere plurality of the Court rendered the decision in the 
context of a class action on behalf of death-sentenced defendants 
seeking appointment of counsel in state post-conviction proceedings in 
Virginia. Id. And it did so using a blanket rule – rather than case-by-
case due process analysis – which has since been rejected by a majority 
of the court. Id. at 10-11. 
Indeed, just five years ago the Court applied Powell-like 
individualized consideration in Turner v. Rogers, when it found a 
litigant in civil contempt proceedings should have been provided with 
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an attorney before sanctioned with jail time. 564 U.S. 431 (2011); see 
also Mae C. Quinn, Giving Kids Their Due: Theorizing A Modern 
Fourteenth Amendment Framework for Juvenile Defense Representation, 
99 IOWA L. REV. 2185, 2210-11 (2014) (describing development over time 
of Fourteenth Amendment right to counsel in civil cases).  
Most importantly here, without regard for its prior determination 
in Giaratanno, the Court in Turner flagged two kinds of civil cases in 
particular where constitutional due process principles called for the 
provision of counsel. The first is where the government is represented in 
such proceedings. 564 U.S. at 449. The other is where the proceedings 
themselves are particularly complex. Id. at 444-445.  
Both considerations are most salient and significant in Mr. 
Christeson’s case, where the State’s representatives are actively seeking 
to carry out an execution and a man is being forced to fight for his life 
through the morass of the federal Anti-Terrorism Effective Death 
Penalty Act (AEDPA). See 28 U.S.C. § 2254; see also Lynn Adelman, 
Federal Habeas Review of State Court Convictions: Incoherent Law but 
an Essential Right, 64 ME. L. REV. 379 (2011) (federal judge lamenting 
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the overly-complicated web of law that has developed under the AEDPA 
but noting the great need for federal review of state criminal cases). 
For these reasons alone the District Court’s summary rejection of 
counsel’s reasonable request for attorney, investigative and expert fees 
should be seen as a due process violation that improperly impairs Mr. 
Christeson’s ability to satisfy habeas standards. 
C. Tying the Hands of Habeas Attorneys in Capital Cases is 
Most Shocking and Egregious When the Accused Has 
Severe Cognitive Impairments 
But even if Powell’s constitutional due process protections are not 
implicated in all or even most post-conviction death sentence cases, they 
most assuredly are triggered when the accused suffers from serious 
mental deficits. Powell’s analysis was deeply informed by the particular 
vulnerabilities of the litigants before the Court who were seeking a post 
hoc determination and intervention based upon a denial of fundamental 
fairness. 
The Court took great pains to describe the special need of the 
particular death-sentenced litigants before it, who were facing the 
possibility of execution while laboring under questionable capacity and 
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ability. Id. at 71. While the rule might be different in other cases, the 
Court specifically admonished, where: 
 . . . the defendant is unable to employ counsel, 
and is incapable adequately of making his own 
defense because of ignorance, feeble mindedness, 
illiteracy, or the like it is the duty of the court, 
whether requested or not, to assign counsel for 
him as a necessary requisite of due process of 
law. 
Id. This is just such a case. 
Yet, the District Court here did not facilitate meaningful 
assignment of counsel. It did the opposite. After the United States 
Supreme Court remanded this case so that competent counsel could 
meaningfully pursue habeas corpus relief on behalf of Mr. Christeson – 
a man described by the High Court as having “severe cognitive 
disabilities” and who needed to “rely entirely on his attorneys” – the 
District Court stopped the defense team in its tracks. Christeson, 135 
S.Ct. at 892.  
Consistent with the United States Supreme Court’s expressed 
concerns about Petitioner’s capacity, counsel sought approval for 
attorney and paralegal fees, a mitigation specialist, a 
neuropsychologist, a neuroimaging analyst, and an intellectual 
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disabilities specialist in order to investigate, develop, and advance Mr. 
Christeson’s previously abandoned legal claims. But the District Court 
denied the requested amount, instead allowing for a total budget of 
merely $10,000 for attorney fees and experts – barely 6% of what 
counsel originally sought in its well-documented and supported ex parte 
proposal. Even if counsel were to provide all services for free, this sum 
would not cover the cost of a single mitigation investigator ($20,420) or 
neuropsychologist ($18,080), facts the District Court took pains to 
highlight when it denied the requested funds. See Budget Order (Doc 
122).  
Such a preemptive fee cap unfairly and improperly restricts the 
defense team’s ability to deliver meaningful legal representation for a 
mentally disabled client – particularly when facing the already uphill 
battle of overcoming a time bar caused by the abandonment of prior 
counsel. See Holland, 560 U.S. 631 (equitable tolling may occur if 
petitioner can show he has been pursuing his rights diligently and some 
extraordinary circumstance, like attorney misconduct, stood in his way). 
Under these circumstances, the Court’s constructive denial of counsel 
not only flies in the face of procedural fairness but amounts to a 
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substantive denial of due process of law. See, e.g., Rochin v. California, 
342 U.S. 165 (1952); County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 845 
(1998). 
III. Requiring Capital Post-Conviction Counsel to Proceed 
without Sufficient Support for Time-Intensive Legal Work, 
Mitigation Investigation, and Forensic Experts Perpetuates 
Deficient, Unethical Representation 
Amici agree with and fully adopt co-Amici American Bar 
Association’s (“ABA”) arguments regarding habeas counsel’s 
professional and ethical duties. We write separately only to emphasize 
these concerns from the unique perspective of the nation’s practicing 
defense attorneys. 
A. Courts Should Not Require Any Lawyer – Let Alone 
Capital Counsel – to Violate Rules of Professional 
Responsibility 
The severity and finality of the death penalty saddles capital 
defense counsel with legal and ethical duties significantly broader and 
greater than those of attorneys in ordinary criminal proceedings. This is 
especially true in the federal habeas setting, where litigation is well 
known to be procedurally and factually complex. See, e.g., Martel, 132 
S.Ct. at 1285; Commentary to Guideline 10.15.1, ABA Guidelines for the 
Appointment and Performance of Capital Counsel in Death Penalty 
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Cases, 31 Hofstra L. Rev. 913, 1085 (2003) (“ABA Capital Counsel 
Guidelines”) (“providing high quality legal representation in collateral 
review proceedings in capital cases requires enormous amounts of time, 
energy and knowledge”). These enhanced duties apply to investigative, 
forensic, and legal work. 
At the same time counsel must meet heightened investigative and 
forensic demands presented by capital post-conviction cases, they owe a 
continuing ethical duty to provide competent representation to clients. 
See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT (“Model Rules”), r. 1.1 (competent 
representation), r. 1.3 (diligence) and r. 1.4 (communication with client) 
(AM. BAR ASS’N 2002). Lawyers are subject to disciplinary action should 
they fail to meet this obligation, and they are responsible for making 
reasonable efforts to ensure the conduct of non-lawyer defense team 
members conforms with the professional rules. See Model Rules, r. 5.3. 
To competently evaluate what claims to raise in a habeas petition, 
counsel must review voluminous court records, often spanning years if 
not decades, and be well-versed in what has been described as “some of 
the most complicated, dynamic, and at times inconsistent bodies of law 
that exist.” Michael Millemann, Capital Post-Conviction Petitioners’ 
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Right to Counsel: Integrating Access to Court Doctrine and Due Process 
Principles, 48 Md. L. Rev. 455, 487 (1989); see also Model Rules, r. 1.1 
cmt.  
Even with the aid of investigators and mitigation specialists, 
analyzing the facts of capital post-conviction cases is an enormous task. 
Yet the District Court’s award compensates counsel for barely 55 hours 
of legal work.2 Any capital attorney or judge knows capital post-
conviction proceedings require significantly more manpower than can 
be generated in 55 hours. In fact, the undersigned amici alone have 
spent that amount of time preparing this brief for the Court. 
And of course, beyond all of this, capital counsel cannot meet their 
ethical duty to capital defendants in post-conviction proceedings 
without the aid of qualified members of a complete defense team, 
including mitigation specialists and other experts. Thus, the District 
Court order put Petitioner’s counsel in an impossible position.  
                                      
 
2  This is calculated from the rate of compensation in death penalty 
cases as of March 2015 (when the budgeting briefing was submitted to 
the District Court): $180 per hour. See http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/cja-
information (last visited 8/3/2016). 
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Without the requisite funds, counsel cannot afford to satisfy their 
obligations to conduct an extensive capital mitigation investigation, 
announced in Supreme Court precedent and ABA guidelines. At the 
same time, they cannot afford not to meet those unambiguous 
professional and ethical obligations. In such instances, a conflict of 
interest may arise whereby counsel are forced to choose between 
working on a case, or paying overhead. See Lawrence Fox, Capital 
Guidelines and Ethical Duties: Mutually Reinforcing Responsibilities, 
36 Hofstra L. Rev. 775, 780-81 (2008). 
B. Pressing Forward Without Funds in a Capital Post-
Conviction Matter is Inconsistent with Professional 
Standards Established by the ABA 
The critical need for not just qualified capital counsel but qualified 
capital defense teams in the post-conviction setting is also delineated in 
various ABA guidelines. See, e.g., ABA Capital Counsel Guidelines, 31 
Hofstra L. Rev. at 921; Supplementary Guidelines for the Mitigation 
Function of Defense Teams in Death Penalty Cases, 36 Hofstra L. Rev. 
677 (2008) (the “Supplemental Guidelines”).  
Such teams must consist of no fewer than two qualified attorneys, 
an investigator, and a mitigation specialist, with “at least one [team] 
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member qualified by training and experience to screen . . . for the 
presence of mental or psychological disorders or impairments” – all of 
whom should be fully and fairly compensated. Guideline 4.1, ABA 
Capital Counsel Guidelines, 31 Hofstra L. Rev. at 952; Guideline 9.1, 
Supplemental Guidelines, 36 Hofstra L. Rev. at 680, 686.3 
As noted by our co-amici, the Supreme Court has long referred to 
the ABA’s Guidelines as “well-defined norms” for capital defense teams 
and “guides to determining what is reasonable.” Wiggins v. Smith, 539 
U.S. 510, 522, 524 (2003); see also Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374 
(2005). Yet counsel here have been asked to proceed without regard for 
professional standards in this life or death case.  
Mitigation specialists in particular, like the ones requested by 
counsel here, are critical members of capital post-conviction defense 
teams. See Guideline 4.1, ABA Capital Counsel Guidelines, 31 Hofstra 
                                      
 
3  The commentary to Guideline 4.1 states: “It is critically important, 
therefore, that each jurisdiction authorize sufficient funds to enable 
counsel in capital cases to conduct a thorough investigation for trial, 
sentencing, appeal, post-conviction and clemency, and to procure and 
effectively present the necessary expert witnesses and documentary 
evidence.” ABA Capital Counsel Guidelines, 31 Hofstra L. Rev. at 955. 
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L. Rev. at 952; Mark E. Olive and Russell Stetler, Using the 
Supplementary Guidelines for the Mitigation Function of Defense Teams 
in Death Penalty Cases to Change the Picture in Post-Conviction, 36 
Hofstra L. Rev. 1067, 1076-77 (2008); Emily Hughes, Mitigating Death, 
18 Cornell J. L. & Pub. Pol’y 337 (June 2009). Thus their retention is 
not a mere suggestion – it is the professional norm by which counsel’s 
effectiveness and reasonableness is measured. Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 
387. Their assistance is especially important where, as here, counsel 
enters late after prior counsel’s abandonment of the client. 
Further, where a capital defendant’s mental health or intellectual 
capacity is at issue, the use of medical and scientific experts is 
essential. See, e.g., Brumfield v. Cain, 135 S.Ct. 2269, 2275-79 (2015) 
(relying heavily on hard science, including medical evidence and expert 
reports, in remanding for Atkins hearing regarding capital petitioner’s 
intellectual functioning); Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986, 1993 (2014) 
(“That this Court, state courts, and state legislatures consult and are 
informed by the work of medical experts in determining intellectual 
disability is unsurprising . . . In determining who qualifies as 
intellectually disabled, it is proper to consult the medical community’s 
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opinions.”); Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 381. Given this necessity, the ABA 
Guidelines mandate that one member of the defense team must have 
specialized training on various mental health and psychological issues. 
Guideline 5.1, Supplemental Guidelines, 36 Hofstra L. Rev. at 683. 
Yet here the District Court’s Budget Order arbitrarily and without 
explanation denied funds necessary to support these critical members of 
the defense team, expecting counsel to abdicate professional norms 
while seeking to assist their cognitively impaired client. 
IV. Summarily Stopping Capital Counsel from Doing their Jobs 
as Ordered by the United States Supreme Court Amounts to a 
Callous Abuse of Discretion that Threatens the Integrity of 
the Entire Justice System 
Beyond the constitutional, statutory, and ethical infirmities 
described above, the District Court’s Order denying sufficient funds to 
capital post-conviction counsel in this case presents serious concerns for 
the larger system of justice. 
A. The Budget Order Demonstrates Disrespect for Supreme 
Court Determinations 
First, the District Court’s apparent disregard for the concerns 
expressed by the United States Supreme Court is deeply troubling. It is 
true that Article III judges, appointed for life, enjoy a certain level of 
independence as decision-makers. But they must act with due deference 
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to determinations of courts of review – and the United States Supreme 
Court in particular. It would be dangerous indeed to allow federal trial 
courts to ignore directives of the highest court in this country, 
particularly when they serve as the final check on unreliable 
executions. See Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 375 (1982) (“unless we 
wish anarchy to prevail within the federal judicial system, a precedent 
of this Court must be followed by the lower federal courts no matter 
how misguided the judges of those courts may think it to be”). 
B. The District Court’s Budget Order Discourages Lawyer 
Involvement in the Most Challenging Cases 
Second, as suggested above, the District Court’s actions here have 
at least a two-fold chilling effect on future representation of death 
eligible clients. On one hand it discourages capital counsel from 
conducting the types of investigations necessary in post-conviction cases 
due to the fact that, while necessary, such investigations are 
prohibitively expensive. As a result, the quality of representation in 
capital habeas proceedings will further suffer. 
On the other hand, the Budget Order will likely dissuade 
experienced and qualified attorneys from taking on capital post-
conviction cases. A post-conviction capital case imposes a significant 
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burden on counsel – emotionally, physically and intellectually. 
Attorneys will be even less likely to take on these more demanding 
cases if they expect, given the court’s treatment of budgeting requests, 
that they will have to bear the bulk of financial burden alone.  
Decades ago, the ABA warned about this phenomenon its 1989 
Capital Counsel Guidelines: 
Unreasonably low fees not only deny the 
defendant the right to effective representation . . . 
. They also place an unfair burden on skilled 
criminal defense lawyers, especially those skilled 
in the highly specialized capital area. These 
attorneys are forced to work for next to nothing 
after assuming the responsibility of representing 
someone who faces a possible sentence of death. 
Failure to provide appropriate compensation 
discourages experienced criminal defense 
practitioners from accepting assignments in 
capital cases (which require counsel to expend 
substantial amounts of time and effort). 
Commentary to Guideline 10.1, ABA Capital Counsel Guidelines (1989), 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/2011_build/deat
h_penalty_representation/1989guidelines.authcheckdam.pdf. 
More recently, studies have concluded the risk is all too real. For 
example, the ABA Capital Counsel Guidelines cited several studies 
which demonstrated an increasing reluctance by experienced counsel to 
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take on capital cases in light of cost concerns. See Commentary to 
Guideline 9.1, ABA Capital Counsel Guidelines, 31 Hofstra L. Rev. at 
986. One of those studies, out of Texas, showed that, “more and more 
experienced private criminal attorneys” were refusing to accept 
appointments in capital cases at least in part because of “the lack of 
compensation for counsel fees and experts/expenses and the enormous 
pressure that they feel in handling these cases.” Id. (citing The 
Spangenberg Group, A Study of Representation in Capital Cases in 
Texas (1993)).  
Similarly, a survey of Mississippi attorneys appointed to represent 
indigent capital defendants found that 82% would “either refuse or be 
very reluctant to accept another appointment because of financial 
considerations.” Commentary to Guideline 9.1, ABA Capital Counsel 
Guidelines, 31 Hofstra L. Rev. at 986 (citing Ruth E. Friedman & Bryan 
A. Stevenson, Solving Alabama’s Capital Defense Problems: It's a 
Dollars and Sense Thing, 44 Ala. L. Rev. 1, 31 n.148 (1992)); see also 
Capital Guidelines and Ethical Duties, 36 Hofstra L. Rev. at 779-80 
(under-compensating lawyers and non-lawyers would impede ability to 
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secure their services, “leaving only those desperate for work – but 
unqualified to handle it – willing to accept these engagements.”). 
Amici do not question the importance of pro bono work as part of 
an attorney’s practice. It may be that the Criminal Justice Act, of which 
Section 3599 is a component, is not intended as an “attorney’s full-
employment act.” In re Carlyle, 644 F.2d at 699. But lawyers still need 
to be fairly compensated. More than this, it is surely unreasonably 
unfair to expect of non-attorney members whose assistance on capital 
habeas cases are mandated by counsel’s professional standard of care. 
And in order to do their jobs competently and effectively, capital 
attorneys need access to the necessary investigative and expert services 
for capital post-conviction proceedings. Without this assurance, even 
fewer qualified attorneys will be willing to take on such matters. 
C. The Practice of Denying Critical Funding to Capital 
Defense Teams, if Uncurbed, Will Result in Unreliable 
Outcomes and Execution of the Innocent 
Third, as noted, death penalty cases are critically different from 
non-capital cases due to the severity and finality of capital punishment. 
See, e.g., Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 357 (1977) (“[D]eath is a 
different kind of punishment from any other which may be imposed in 
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this country . . . in both its severity and its finality.”). Yet embrace of 
the District Court’s approach here will tragically expand the risk of 
error leading to possible wrongful executions.  
Failure to obtain post-conviction relief can result in wrongful 
execution. Indeed, rates of exoneration among capital defendants is far 
higher than for any other category of criminal convictions due in large 
part to the greater attention and resources devoted to death penalty 
cases before and after conviction. Samuel R. Gross, et al., Rate of false 
conviction of criminal defendants who are sentenced to death, 111 
PNAS, no. 20, May 20, 2014, at 7230-7235 (estimating that 4.1% of 
defendants sentenced to death from 1973 through 2004 were the result 
of erroneous convictions).  
Yet Missouri executes individuals at a rate higher than nearly 
every other state. See Tracy L. Snell, Bureau of Justice Statistics, NCJ 
248448 Capital Punishment, 2013 – Statistical Tables (in the 2014 
calendar year, Missouri tied Texas for most executions – 10 – nearly a 
third of all executions carried out that year). This should be no surprise 
given that Missouri public defenders are among the worst resourced in 
the country. See, e.g., Barrett v. Nixon, No. 16AC-CC00290 (Mo. 19th 
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Cir. Ct., filed July 13, 2016) (lawsuit by the Missouri Public Defender 
Commission alleging Missouri Governor Nixon improperly withheld 
necessary funds from the Office of State Public Defender).4 
In sum, the need for well-resourced capital representation 
(including the need for investigative, expert and other services in aid of 
the defense) has been long recognized and reflected in statutes, law and 
ABA standards – and for good reason. They reflect the truth that 
habeas proceedings cannot promote “fundamental fairness in the 
imposition of the death penalty” without the aid of competent, effective 
representation. Martel, 132 S.Ct. at 1285. 
D. The Trend of Denying Funding to Capital Defense 
Teams Fosters Disrespect for an Already Discredited 
Criminal Justice System 
Finally, when indigent capital defendants are denied effective 
counsel in collateral proceedings, it is not just the individual defendants 
                                      
 
4  See also Rachel Lippmann, Despite positive reputation, Missouri’s 
juvenile justice system has serious systemic problems, ST. LOUIS PUBLIC 
RADIO (Oct. 5, 2015) (in 2009, Missouri ranked 49th in the country for 
public defender funding), http://news.stlpublicradio.org/post/despite-
positive-reputation-missouris-juvenile-justice-system-has-serious-
systemic-problems#stream/0. 
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who suffer. The justice system as a whole is victimized when courts fail 
to ensure just compensation for capital post-conviction defense teams.  
What Justice Stewart wrote forty years ago rings just as true 
today: “[T]he penalty of death is qualitatively different from a sentence 
of imprisonment, however long. . . . Because of that qualitative 
difference, there is a corresponding difference in the need for reliability 
in the determination that death is the appropriate punishment in a 
specific case.” Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976). 
By brusquely denying Petitioner’s budget as excessive, and cutting 
the award for fees and expenses by over 90%, the District Court 
impeded counsel’s ability to provide effective representation so severely 
as to constitute constructive denial of counsel in seeking to overcome a 
time bar caused by prior incompetent counsel. As a result, the District 
Court blocked Mark Christeson’s final chance at obtaining a first look at 
constitutional violations stemming from his trial and sentencing. When 
death is on the line, such opportunities for review cannot be so curtly 
denied. 
It is not possible to maintain the integrity and fairness of capital 
punishment, and habeas proceedings generally, if district court judges 
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continue to interfere with representation in this manner with no check 
on their abuse of discretion. This is especially true in a case such as 
this, where: (1) there has been clear abandonment by prior habeas 
counsel; (2) Petitioner has never had the opportunity for full habeas 
review of his conviction and capital sentence; and (3) the matter was 
originally tried by lawyers in a state ranked second to last for defense 
funds. See Derwyn Bunton, Op-Ed. When the Public Defender Says, ‘I 
Can’t Help,’ N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 2016, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/19/opinion/when-the-public-defender-
says-i-cant-help.html?_r=0.  
As Missouri’s criminal justice system contends with the findings of 
two recent United States Department of Justice investigations and its 
indigent defense system is seen as a mockery, the District Court’s 
Budget Order represents a dangerous precedent which places these 
interests at grave risk. See, e.g., John Pfaff, Op-Ed., A Mockery of 
Justice for the Poor, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29, 2016; see also Christine Byers, 
Feds Accuse St. Louis Family Court of Rights Violations and Racial 
Bias, ST. LOUIS POST DISPATCH, Aug. 1, 2015. 
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CONCLUSION 
For all these reasons, as a matter of law and public policy, this 
Court should set aside the District Court’s Budget Order so as to 
discourage constructive denial of counsel in this and future capital post-
conviction cases in the federal court system. Further, it should grant 
the relief requested by counsel for Petitioner. 
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